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Abstract 
In theory, well designed electricity markets should deliver an efficient mix of 
technologies at least-cost. But energy market theories and energy market modelling 
are based upon equilibrium analysis and in practice electricity markets can be off-
equilibrium for extended periods.  Near-term spot and forward contract prices can 
and do fall well below, or substantially exceed, relevant entry cost benchmarks and 
associated long run equilibrium prices.  However, given sufficient time higher prices, 
on average or during certain periods, create incentives for new entrant plant which 
in turn has the effect of capping longer-dated average spot price expectations at the 
estimated cost of the relevant new entrant technologies.  In this article, we trace 
generalised new entrant benchmarks and their relationship to spot price outcomes in 
Australia’s National Electricity Market over the 20-year period to 2018; from coal, to 
gas and more recently to variable renewables plus firming, notionally provided by – 
or shadow priced at – the carrying cost of an Open Cycle Gas Turbine.  This latest 
entry benchmark relies implicitly, but critically, on the gains from exchange in 
organised spot markets, using existing spare capacity.  As aging coal plant exit, gains 
from exchange may gradually diminish with ‘notional firming’ increasingly and 
necessarily being met by physical firming. At this point, the benchmark must once 
again move to a new technology set…   
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1. Introduction 
Australia’s National Electricity Market (NEM) is unique amongst restructured electricity 
systems with its centrepiece being a single real-time gross pool platform (MacGill, 2010). 
Every five minutes, a new spot electricity price is formed under a uniform first-price auction 
clearing mechanism, along with eight Frequency Control Ancillary Service spot market prices 
cleared in the same manner, with electricity production and frequency control services co-
optimised across five imperfectly interconnected States/regions (Simshauser & Tiernan, 
2018).  A single Independent Market Operator coordinates all generators and bulk loads in all 
regions and all spot markets, and, again somewhat uniquely, without any formal day-ahead or 
capacity market (Riesz et al. 2015).  Instead, Resource Adequacy is driven by the NEM’s 
very high Value of Lost Load (VoLL) or Market Price Cap; at AUD1 $14,500/MWh it is 
amongst the highest in the world.  Forward derivative contracts are traded both on-exchange 
and over-the-counter and have historically exhibited turnover of 300+% of physical trade. 
Certain regions and seasons are significantly more liquid than others.  
 
Historically, NEM spot prices have exhibited considerable volatility within and across 
reporting periods.  Along with short run variations associated with weather and anthropogenic 
patterns, medium-run supply-imbalances drive volatility.  Over the long run, given aggregate 
demand growth, or more relevantly in the current environment with flat final demand – the 
exit of aging coal plant “at-scale” – average spot prices will gravitate towards the cost of the 
relevant new entrant technology (or technology set).  That is, higher prices on average, or 
during certain periods, will create incentives for targeted new entrant plant which in turn has 
the effect of capping longer-dated average spot price expectations at the estimated cost of the 
relevant new entrant technologies.   
                                                 
 Professor of Economics, Griffith Business School, Griffith University.  Research Associate, Energy Policy Research Group, 
University of Cambridge.   
 Head of Corporate Development & Head of Regulatory Affairs at Infigen Energy, respectively. 
 
1 All figures presented in Australian Dollars.  At the time of writing, AUD/US ~ 0.72 and AUD/GBP ~ 0.57. 
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Over time, prices on average or during certain periods also regulate the plant mix as defined 
by the rich blend of fixed and variable costs associated with various generating technologies 
(i.e. base, intermediate, peak, variable renewable). Security-constrained power system 
simulation models reinforce this view.  These sophisticated Monte Carlo-based Linear 
Programming models - derived from the original joint work in the field by Electricite de 
France Chief Economist Marcel Boiteux and State Electricity Commission of Victoria Chief 
Engineer Dr Rob Booth - apply the principles of Calabrese (1947), Boiteux (1949), Berrie 
(1967) and Booth (1972) and are at their core based on equilibrium analysis.   
 
Of course, in practice energy markets are frequently off-equilibrium.  Near-term spot and 
forward contract prices can and do fall well below, or substantially exceed the relevant entry 
cost benchmarks and sometimes for extended periods due to transient structural imbalances 
within the plant stock.  That structural imbalances exist in the first place means the cure to 
rising prices is not always more base plant. Understanding these principles is quite essential to 
understanding the fundamentals of power system planning, likely investment commitments 
and the long run marginal cost of power generation.  That is, central to the task of power 
system modelling and investment analysis is the equilibrium price of power, and for 
expediency we will refer to this as the new entrant cost.  Terminology is important; new 
entrant cost is often used interchangeably with long run marginal cost; but in this article we 
are dealing specifically with the former for reasons outlined in Turvey (2000). 
 
Australia’s NEM exhibited two decades of consistent economic and technical performance.  
However, over the period between 2012-2018 average spot prices more than doubled; from 
$30/MWh in 2012 to more than $80/MWh in 2018 in nominal terms.  During FY17 the 
Independent Market Operator issued more than 20 Lack off Reserve notices and operated the 
power system outside a secure operating state (i.e. for more than 30 minutes at a time) on 
almost a dozen occasions2.  Two major blackouts occurred in the South Australian region, 
including a complete system collapse.  The cause of these conditions can be summarised 
briefly3 as 1) the exit of 5000MW of coal plant with an average notification period of just 5 
months; 2) a domestic gas market experiencing shortages due to the commissioning of excess 
LNG export capacity; and 3) policy discontinuity vis-à-vis carbon pricing and renewable 
portfolio standards (Nelson, 2018; Simshauser & Tiernan, 2018). 
 
While the speed, scale and consequential short-run impacts of coal plant exit represented a 
form of market failure, at one level a clinical analysis of supply-side dynamics reveals the 
NEM institutional design maintained its consistent economic performance.  Policy 
discontinuity in prior periods made the timing of coal plant exit highly unpredictable, and 
severe structural problems in the adjacent market for natural gas all but eliminated the 
flexibility of the NEM’s gas-fired fleet to respond in a manner that it otherwise should have.  
Ultimately, policy discontinuity caused capacity shortfalls to emerge and prices increased – as 
they should.   
 
New investments in plant capacity are now running at record levels; over the period 2016-
2018, more than 8,000MW or ~$16 billion of large-scale plant4 was committed – all of it 
variable renewable capacity as Figure 2 later reveals.  But the intriguing aspect of this recent 
investment cycle has been the material change in entry cost dynamics – which as our 
subsequent quantitative analysis reveals, is the fourth such transition over the past two 
decades. 
 
Although power project investment commitment involves revenue analysis for discrete 
projects based on market modelling and associated forecasts, individual project costs and 
resources vary significantly; thus an understanding of historic and future trends provides 
                                                 
2 See AEMC (2018) at footnote 28.  
3 The triggers for each event were different; in one case by unexpectedly high demand, in another due to extreme weather and 
unknown fault ride through settings. However, the pace of change has made determining appropriate operating envelopes more 
challenging. 
4 Small amounts of non-scheduled biomass/biofuel plant were also constructed or expanded, as well as some 5,000 MW of 
rooftop solar PV capacity. 
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useful context vis-à-vis benchmark pricing.  This can inform the indicative cost of supplying 
customers into the future, but also highlights key inputs and sensitivities for long-term 
planning and policy. 
 
To generalise, analysts currently describe NEM entry costs as being “renewables plus 
firming” (see for example Nelson, 2018).  In this instance, renewables means wind or solar 
PV, and firming is notionally (or shadow-) priced at the carrying cost of an Open Cycle Gas 
Turbine (OCGT) plant – either physically or financially through derivative instruments.  Over 
the medium term this benchmark appears sound enough.   
 
But over the long run, important implicit assumptions underpinning this particular (and 
notional) new entrant technology set may not hold if low marginal running cost coal plant 
continue to exit at-scale.  This benchmark relies critically on exhausting available gains from 
exchange in the NEMs mandatory gross pool and may understate grid connection and 
frequency control ancillary services costs (i.e. the evidence suggesting they are rising).  To 
understand this set of dynamics, it helps to reflect on how the reference new entrant 
technology and associated costs/prices have changed over time, and this forms the primary 
purpose of this article.     
 
This article is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the PF Model and relevant input 
assumptions. Section 3 presents Model results. Section 4 reviews changes to fuel cost 
fundamentals and its implications for the market, while Section 5 summarises entry dynamics 
over the 20-year period 1999-2018 and contrasts this with spot prices. Section 6 examines the 
stability of the prevailing new entrant benchmark.  Conclusions follow. 
 
2. Entry costs and the PF Model  
The PF Model, a dynamic multi-period post-tax discounted cash flow model, has been 
specifically designed to produce generalised estimates of the cost of plant entry.  The model 
solves for multiple generating technologies, business combinations and financing structures 
and simultaneously determines convergent price, debt-sizing and post-tax equity returns, 𝐾𝑒.  
Model outputs are similar to levelised cost estimates but with a level of detail well beyond 
conventional traditional Levelised Cost of Electricity Model results because corporate and 
project financing constraints and taxation variables are co-optimised.  The model logic is 
organised as follows:   
 
 Model Overview 
In the PF Model, costs increase annually by a forecast general inflation rate (CPI).  Prices 
escalate at a discount to CPI.  Inflation rates for revenue streams 𝜋𝑗
𝑅 and cost streams 𝜋𝑗
𝐶 in 
period (year) j are calculated as follows: 
 
𝜋𝑗
𝑅 = [1 + (
𝐶𝑃𝐼×𝛼𝑅
100
)]
𝑗
 , and 𝜋𝑗
𝐶 = [1 + (
𝐶𝑃𝐼×𝛼𝐶
100
)]
𝑗
     (1)      
 
The discounted value for 𝛼𝑅 reflects single factor learning rates that characterise generating 
technologies.   
 
Energy output 𝜌𝑗
𝑖  from each plant (i) in each period (j) is a key variable in driving revenue 
streams, unit fuel costs and variable Operations & Maintenance costs.  Energy output is 
calculated by reference to installed capacity 𝑘𝑖, capacity utilisation rate 𝐶𝐹𝑗
𝑖 for each period j.  
Plant auxillary losses 𝐴𝑢𝑥𝑖 arising from on-site electrical loads are deducted.   
 
𝜌𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐶𝐹𝑗
𝑖. 𝑘𝑖. (1 − 𝐴𝑢𝑥𝑖)        (2) 
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A convergent electricity price for the ith plant (𝑝𝑖𝜀) is calculated in year one and escalated per 
eq. (1).5  Thus revenue for the ith plant in each period j is defined as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑗
𝑖 = (𝜌𝑗
𝑖 . 𝑝𝑖𝜀 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅)         (3) 
 
In order to define marginal running costs, the thermal efficiency for each generation 
technology 𝜁𝑖 needs to be defined.  The constant term ‘3600’6 is divided by 𝜁𝑖 to convert the 
efficiency result from % to kJ/kWh.  This is then multiplied by raw fuel commodity cost 𝑓𝑖.  
Variable Operations & Maintenance costs 𝑣𝑖, where relevant, are added which produces a 
pre-carbon short run marginal cost.  Under conditions of externality pricing 𝐶𝑃𝑗, the CO2 
intensity of output needs to be defined.  Plant carbon intensity 𝑔𝑖 is derived by multiplying 
the plant heat rate by combustion emissions ?̇?𝑖 and fugitive CO2 emissions 𝑔𝑖.  Marginal 
running costs in the jth period is then calculated by the product of short run marginal 
production costs by generation output 𝜌𝑗
𝑖  and escalated at the rate of 𝜋𝑗
𝐶. 
 
𝜗𝑗
𝑖 = {[(
(3600
𝜁𝑖⁄
)
1000
. 𝑓𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖) + (𝑔𝑖. 𝐶𝑃𝑗)] . 𝜌𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝐶|𝑔𝑖 = (?̇?𝑖 + 𝑔𝑖).
(3600
𝜁𝑖⁄
)
1000
}  (4) 
 
Fixed Operations & Maintenance costs 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 of the plant are measured in $/MW/year of 
installed capacity 𝐹𝐶𝑖 and are multiplied by plant capacity 𝑘𝑖 and escalated.   
 
𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐹𝐶𝑖 . 𝑘𝑖. 𝜋𝑗
𝐶         (5)
    
Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortisation (EBITDA) in the jth period can 
therefore be defined as follows: 
 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 = (𝑅𝑗
𝑖 − 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖)        (6) 
    
Capital Costs (𝑋0
𝑖) for each plant i are Overnight Capital Costs and incurred in year 0.7  
Ongoing capital spending for each period j is determined as the inflated annual assumed 
capital works program. 
 
𝑥𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑐𝑗
𝑖. 𝜋𝑗
𝐶          (7) 
 
Plant capital costs 𝑋0
𝑖  give rise to tax depreciation (𝑑𝑗
𝑖) such that if the current period was 
greater than the plant life under taxation law (L), then the value is 0.  In addition, 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 also gives 
rise to tax depreciation such that: 
 
𝑑𝑗
𝑖 = (
𝑋0
𝑖
𝐿
) + (
𝑥𝑗
𝑖
𝐿+1−𝑗
)         (8) 
 
From here, taxation payable (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) at the corporate taxation rate (𝜏𝑐) is applied to 
 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖  less Interest on Loans (𝐼𝑗
𝑖) later defined in (16), less 𝑑𝑗
𝑖.  To the extent (𝜏𝑗
𝑖) results 
in non-positive outcome, tax losses (𝐿𝑗
𝑖) are carried forward and offset against future periods. 
 
𝜏𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, ( 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐)      (9) 
                                                 
5
 Note that thermal plant also earns ancillary services revenue, which in the model equates to about 0.3% of electricity sales.  
This has been the historic average although as VRE increases, this can be expected to change dramatically. 
6
 The derivation of the constant term 3600 is: 1 Watt = 1 Joule per second and hence 1 Watt Hour = 3600 Joules. 
7
 The model is capable of dealing with multi-period construction programs such that 𝑋𝑗
𝑖 = −∑ 𝐶𝑘 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−𝑘 .𝑁𝑘=1   However, for 
the present exercise, all plant capital costs are ‘Overnight Capital Costs’ (i.e. as if the plant were purchased at the completion of 
construction) and therefore include an allowance for capitalised interest during construction.  
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𝐿𝑗
𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝑛(0, ( 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗−1
𝑖 ). 𝜏𝑐)      (10) 
 
The debt financing model computes interest and principal repayments on different debt 
facilities depending on the type, structure and tenor of tranches.  There are two types of debt 
facilities – (a) corporate facilities (i.e. balance-sheet financings) and (2) project financings.  
Debt structures include semi-permanent amortising facilities and bullet facilities.   
Corporate Finance involve 5- and 7-year bond issues with an implied ‘BBB’ credit rating.  
Project Finance include a 5-7 year bullet facility requiring interest-only payments after which 
it is refinanced with consecutive amortising facilities and fully amortised over an 18-25 year 
period (depending on the technology).  The second facility commences with a tenor of 7-12 
years as an amortising facility set within a semi-permanent structure with a nominal 
repayment term of 18-25 years.  The decision tree for the two tranches of debt was the same, 
so for the Debt Tranche where 𝐷𝑇 = 1 or 2, the calculation is as follows: 
 
𝑖𝑓 𝑗 {
> 1, 𝐷𝑇𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐷𝑇𝑗−1
𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗−1
𝑖
= 1,𝐷𝑇1
𝑖 = 𝐷0
𝑖 . 𝑆                  
       (11) 
 
𝐷0
𝑖  refers to the total amount of debt used in the project.  The split (S) of the debt between 
each facility refers to the manner in which debt is apportioned to each tranche.  In the model, 
35% of debt is assigned to Tranche 1 and the remainder to Tranche 2.  Principal 𝑃𝑗−1
𝑖  refers to 
the amount of principal repayment for tranche T in period j and is calculated as an annuity: 
 
𝑃𝑗
𝑖 = (
𝐷𝑇𝑗
𝑖
[
1−(1+(𝑅𝑇𝑗
𝑧 +𝐶𝑇𝑗
𝑧 ))−𝑛
𝑅𝑇𝑗
𝑧 +𝐶𝑇𝑗
𝑧 ]
|𝑧 {
= 𝑉𝐼
= 𝑃𝐹
)       (12) 
 
In (12), 𝑅𝑇𝑗 is the relevant interest rate swap (5yr, 7yr or 12yr) and 𝐶𝑇𝑗 is the credit spread or 
margin relevant to the issued Debt Tranche.  The relevant interest payment in the jth period 
(𝐼𝑗
𝑖) is calculated as the product of the (fixed) interest rate on the loan by the amount of loan 
outstanding: 
 
𝐼𝑗
𝑖 = 𝐷𝑇𝑗
𝑖 × (𝑅𝑇𝑗
𝑧 + 𝐶𝑇𝑗
𝑧 )        (13) 
 
Total Debt outstanding 𝐷𝑗
𝑖, total Interest 𝐼𝑗
𝑖  and total Principle 𝑃𝑗
𝑖 for the ith plant is calculated 
as the sum of the above components for the two debt tranches in time j.  For clarity, Loan 
Drawings are equal to 𝐷0
𝑖  in year 1 as part of the initial financing and are otherwise 0.   
 
One of the key calculations is the initial derivation of 𝐷0
𝑖  (as per eq.11).  This is determined 
by the product of the gearing level and the Overnight Capital Cost (𝑋0
𝑖).  Gearing levels are 
formed by applying a cash flow constraint based on credit metrics applied by project banks 
and capital markets.  The variable 𝛾 in our PF Model relates specifically to the legal structure 
of the business and the credible capital structure achievable.  The two relevant legal structures 
are Vertically Integrated (VI) merchant utilities (issuing ‘BBB’ rated bonds) and Independent 
Power Producers using Project Finance (PF).  
 
𝑖𝑖𝑓 𝛾
{
 
 
 
        = 𝑉𝐼,
𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑗
𝑖
𝐼𝑗
𝑖 ≥ 𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼∀ 𝑗 |
𝐷𝑗
𝑖
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 ≥ 𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼∀ 𝑗 |𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑗
𝑖 = (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑥𝑗
𝑖)                                                         
= 𝑃𝐹,𝑀𝑖𝑛(𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 , 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖) ≥ 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹 , ∀ 𝑗  | 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗 =
(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖−𝑥𝑗
𝑖−𝜏𝑗
𝑖)
𝑃𝑗
𝑖+𝐼𝑗
𝑖  |𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑗 =
∑ [(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖−𝑥𝑗
𝑖−𝜏𝑗
𝑖).(1+𝐾𝑑)
−𝑗]𝑁𝑗=1
𝐷𝑗
𝑖   
 (14)
     
The variables 𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼and 𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼 are exogenously determined by credit rating agencies and are 
outlined in Table 3.  Values for 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹 are exogenously determined by project banks and depend 
on technology (i.e. thermal vs. renewable) and the extent of energy market exposure, that is 
whether a Power Purchase Agreement exists or not.  For clarity, 𝐹𝐹𝑂𝑗
𝑖 is ‘Funds From 
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Operations’ while 𝐷𝑆𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 and 𝐿𝐿𝐶𝑅𝑗
𝑖 are the Debt Service Cover Ratio and Loan Life Cover 
Ratios.  Debt drawn is: 
𝐷0
𝑖
= 𝑋0
𝑖 − ∑ [𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑗
𝑖
−𝑃𝑗
𝑖
− 𝜏𝑗
𝑖] . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1        (15) 
 
At this point, all of the necessary conditions exist to produce estimates of the long run 
marginal cost of power generation technologies8 along with relevant equations to solve for the 
price (𝑝𝑖𝜀) given expected equity returns (𝐾𝑒) whilst simultaneously meeting the constraints 
of 𝛿𝑗
𝑉𝐼 and 𝜔𝑗
𝑉𝐼 or 𝛿𝑗
𝑃𝐹given the relevant business combinations.  The primary objective is to 
expand every term which contains 𝑝𝑖𝜀.  Expansion of the EBITDA and Tax terms is as 
follows: 
 
−𝑋0
𝑖 + ∑ [(𝑝𝑖𝜀. 𝜌𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅) − 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑃𝑗
𝑖 − ((𝑝𝑖𝜀. 𝜌𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅) − 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐼𝑗
𝑖 − 𝑑𝑗
𝑖 − 𝐿𝑗−1
𝑖 ) . 𝜏𝑐] . (1 +
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) − 𝐷0
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1          (16) 
 
The terms are then rearranged such that only the 𝑝𝑖𝜀 term is on the left-hand side of the 
equation: 
 
Let 𝐼𝑅𝑅 ≡  𝐾𝑒   
 
∑ (1 − 𝜏𝑐).𝑝𝑖𝜀. 𝜌𝑗
𝑖 . 𝜋𝑗
𝑅. (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 =  𝑋0
𝑖 −∑ [−(1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝜗𝑗
𝑖 − (1 − 𝜏𝑐). 𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖 − (1 − 𝜏𝑐). (𝐼𝑗
𝑖
) −𝑃𝑗
𝑖
+𝑁𝑗=1
𝜏𝑐 . 𝑑𝑗
𝑖 + 𝜏𝑐𝐿𝑗−1
𝑖 ). (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)] + ∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 . (1 + 𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗) +𝐷0
𝑖𝑁
𝑗=1       (17) 
 
The model then solves for 𝑝𝑖𝜀 such that: 
 
𝑝𝑖𝜀 = 
𝑋0
𝑖
∑ (1−𝜏𝑐).𝑃
𝜀.𝜋𝑗
𝑅.(1+𝐾𝑒)−
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1
+
∑ ((1−𝜏𝑐).𝜗𝑗
𝑖+(1−𝜏𝑐).𝐹𝑂𝑀𝑗
𝑖+(1−𝜏𝑐).(𝐼𝑗
𝑖)+𝑃𝑗
𝑖−𝜏𝑐.𝑑𝑗
𝑖−𝜏𝑐𝐿𝑗−1
𝑖 ).(1+𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗))𝑁𝑗=1
∑ (1−𝜏𝑐).
𝑁
𝑗=1 𝜌𝑗
𝑖 .𝜋
𝑗
𝑅
.(1+𝐾𝑒)−
(𝑗) 
+
∑ 𝑥𝑗
𝑖 .(1+𝐾𝑒)
−(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1 +𝐷0
𝑖
∑ (1−𝜏𝑐).𝜌𝑗
𝑖 .𝜋
𝑗
𝑅
.(1+𝐾𝑒)−
(𝑗)𝑁
𝑗=1
 
           (18) 
 
 Model Assumptions 
Key data inputs for the PF Model are presented in Tables 1-2 and cover five new entrant 
technologies over four distinct time-horizons, and two financing structures.     
 
                                                 
8 The return on equity in the PF Model is assumed to provide fair compensation to equity investors for the systematic risk 
associated with the investment, and is estimated using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). For tractability, electricity 
prices in the PF Model are assumed to be deterministic rather than stochastic. In practice, however, there is a high degree of 
uncertainty over future electricity prices. Further, entry into the market involves significant sunk cost. In the presence of 
significant future uncertainty and large sunk costs, the option value of waiting to invest can be material. Once the decision to 
invest is taken, the option to delay investment to resolve further future uncertainty is extinguished. The extinguishment of a 
valuable option represents a cost to investors that ought to be accounted for in the investment decision. If the option value 
foregone is positive, then the investment hurdle rate will be larger than 𝐾𝑒, the required return on equity estimated using the 
CAPM.  
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 Technology Assumptions 1999-2018 
 
 
 Corporate & Project Finance Assumptions 
 
 
3. Model results 
Tables 1-2 provide sufficient data inputs for the PF Model to produce generalised entry cost 
estimates (i.e. Average Total Cost, including normal profit) for new entrant plant across four 
specific timeframes, viz.  2004, 2007, 2012 and 2018, along with the Average Total Cost of 
Incumbent Coal plant in 1999.  These dates were selected because they capture our view of 
four distinct phases of generator entry, which in turn helps explain NEM average price 
dynamics and associated technology trends, as presented in the following sections.   
 
Figure 1 presents the relevant benchmark technology for each of the specific timeframes 
outlined above (a full comparative analysis of all technologies in each of the specific 
timeframes, i.e. 2004, 2007, 2012 and 2018, is presented in Appendix I).  For clarity, in the 
PF Model conventional technologies including Coal, Combined Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) 
and Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) plant are assumed to be Balance Sheet-financed 
(gearing ca.32-38%, meeting -BBB credit metrics) while variable renewable plant (viz. Wind, 
Solar PV) are assumed to be Project Financed (ca.65-70% debt) and underpinned by long-
Technology Capex
Installed 
Capacity
Generating 
Units
Unit Heat 
Rate
Unit Fuel 
Cost
Capacity 
Factor
Fixed O&M 
Cost
Variable 
O&M
Capital 
Works
Auxillary 
Load
Carbon 
Intensity
($/kW) (MW) (MW) (kJ/kWh) ($/GJ) (%) ($/MW/a) ($/MWh) (%) (%) (t/MWh)
Incumbent - 1999
  Black Coal 1,000       1,000       2                  10,000     1.10         87.5% 52,500           1.00         0.25% 7.50% 0.92          
2004 Inputs
  Black Coal 1,400       1,000       2                  9,500       0.70         87.5% 45,000           -           0.25% 7.00% 0.86          
  CCGT 1,000       400          1                  7,000       3.00         70% 8,000             4.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.40          
  OCGT 700          300          2                  11,300     3.00         10% 5,600             4.00         0.05% 1.00% 0.60          
  Wind 2,250       30            30                -           -           35% 35,000           -           0.05% 0.00% -           
2007 Inputs
  Black Coal 1,500       1,000       2                  9,500       2.00         87.5% 48,000           1.00         0.25% 7.00% 0.86          
  CCGT 1,250       400          1                  7,000       3.00         70% 9,000             4.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.40          
  OCGT 875          300          2                  11,300     3.50         10% 6,300             4.00         0.05% 0.00% 0.60          
  Wind 2,100       50            28                -           -           35% 37,000           3.00         0.05% 0.00% -           
2012 Inputs
  Black Coal 2,250       1,000       2                  9,000       2.00         90% 49,250           2.00         0.25% 7.10% 0.81          
  CCGT 1,275       400          1                  6,965       6.00         70% 9,500             7.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.36          
  OCGT 893          300          2                  11,300     7.00         10% 6,650             10.00       0.05% 0.00% 0.60          
  Wind 2,500       250          100              -           -           39% 41,000           3.00         0.05% 0.00% -           
  Solar PV 3,500       100          -              -           -           25% 35,000           0.05% 0.00% -           
2018 Inputs
  Black Coal 3,050       1,000       2                  8,571       2.78         90% 50,500           4.00         0.25% 7.10% 0.77          
  CCGT 1,500       400          1                  6,930       8.50         70% 10,000           7.00         0.05% 3.00% 0.36          
  OCGT 1,050       500          2                  11,300     10.00       0% 7,000             10.00       0.05% 1.00% 0.60          
  Wind 1,975       450          118              -           -           39% 45,000           3.00         0.05% 0.00% -           
  Solar PV 1,550       100          -              -           -           26% 30,000           -           0.05% 0.00% -           
Coal & Gas 2004 2007 2012 2018 Wind & Solar 2004 2007 2012 2018
Debt Sizing Constraints Debt Sizing Constraints
  - FFO/I (times) 5 5 5 5   - DSCR (times) 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
  - FFO/D (times) 3 3 3 3   - LLCR (times) 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
  - Gearing Limit (%) 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0   - Gearing Limit (%) 85.0 85.0 85.0 65.0
  - Default (times) 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
Corporate 'BBB' Bond Issue Project Finance Facilities - Tenor
  - Tranche 1 (Bullet) (Yrs) 5 5 5 5   - Tranche 1 (Bullet) (Yrs) 5 5 5 5
  - Tranche 1 Refi (Yrs) 13-20 13-20 13-20 13-20   - Tranche 1 Refi (Yrs) 13-20 13-20 13-20 13-20
  - Tranche 2 (Amort.) (Yrs) 12 12 10 7   - Tranche 2 (Amort.) (Yrs) 10 10 10 7
  - Notional amortisation (Yrs) 18-25 18-25 18-25 18-25   - Notional amortisation (Yrs) 18-25 18-25 18-25 18-25
BBB' Bond Pricing Project Finance Facilities - Pricing
  - Tranche 1 (%) 7.66 7.69 6.14 3.60   - Tranche 1 Swap (%) 5.72 7.00 3.66 2.55
  - Tranche 1 Margin (bps) 54 69 247 105   - Tranche 1 Margin (bps) 120 150 250 200
  - Tranche 2 (%) 6.38 7.66 6.90 3.97   - Tranche 2 Swap (%) 3.67 4.90 4.10 2.68
  - Tranche 2 Margin (bps) 271 275 280 129   - Tranche 2 Margin (bps) 140 170 270 220
  - Tranche 1 (%) 7.66 7.69 6.14 3.60   - Tranche 1 (%) 6.92 8.50 6.16 4.55
  - Tranche 2 (%) 6.38 7.66 6.90 3.97   - Tranche 2 (%) 5.07 6.60 6.80 4.88
  - Tranche 1&2 Refi (%) 6.38 7.66 6.90 3.97   - Tranche 1&2 Refi (%) 7.50 7.50 6.80 4.88
  - Post Tax Equity Coal (%) 12.0 12.0 15.0 15.0   - Post Tax Equity (%) 12.0 12.0 12.0 10.0
  - Post Tax Equity Gas (%) 0.0 12.0 12.0 12.0
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dated PPAs, which in turn are assumed to be written by BBB-rated counterparties.  Notice 
that the Average Total Cost of Incumbent Coal plant in 1999 was ~$35/MWh in nominal 
terms.   
 New entrant technologies and entry costs (nominal dollars) 
  
 
 Period 1:  1999 to 2004 – Black Coal 
From 1999-2004, Supercritical coal plant was the dominant technology and accordingly, 
formed an equilibrium price in forward forecasts and investment planning.  This is far more 
than theory.  3000MW of Supercritical black coal plant was committed in the Queensland 
region of the NEM during this period.  The new entrant cost in 2004 was about $35/MWh in 
nominal terms – that is, almost $4/MWh lower than the average total cost of incumbent coal 
plant (which by 2004 was ~$39/MWh after accounting for cost inflation).  A falling spot price 
outlook by 2004 ultimately regulated the extent of new Supercritical coal plant entry. 
 
 Period 2: 2005 to 2011 – CCGT 
From 2005-2011, CCGT plant overtook coal as the dominant new entrant technology, and 
formed the new market benchmark.  As the new entrant benchmark moved from coal to 
CCGT plant, entry costs moved from $35/MWh to $45/MWh in nominal terms. The change 
occurred when there was no foreseeable link to international oil prices, and when natural gas 
was therefore sold in a competitive market on a cost-plus-margin basis.  Long-dated (10-15 
year) Gas Supply Agreements for CCGT plant could be secured for $2.50 – 4.00/GJ as Figure 
7 later reveals.  Although slightly higher cost than new coal plant this technological switch 
was primarily driven by an abundance of natural gas, and the expectation by utilities and 
investors of an Australian Emissions Trading Scheme9 – CO2 emissions from CCGT plant 
(0.4t/MWh) being less than half their coal-fired counterparts (0.9t/MWh).   
 
Importantly, there were no new coal plant commitments from 2005 onwards – the risk of 
future carbon pricing being an important variable.10  About 5000MW of gas plant was 
committed throughout the NEM in Period 2; 2000 MW of which was CCGT and at least 
1000MW of semi-intermediate (i.e. hard-working) OCGT plant – the latter made possible by 
the availability of very low cost natural gas.  
 
 Period 3: 2012 to 2015 – CCGT, but Renewables enter 
By 2012 the forward price of natural gas had increased to $6/GJ.  Consequently, so too did 
the entry cost of CCGT plant – rising from $45/MWh to $70/MWh.  Australia’s (temporary 
$23/t) Carbon Tax was in force throughout the period 2012-2014 but the policy was 
                                                 
9 From 2007-2009 an Emissions Trading Scheme was bi-partisan policy. See Simshauser & Tiernan (2018). 
10 The 750MW Kogan Creek coal-fired plant in Queensland was the last investment committed (in 2004) and was commissioned 
in 2007. 
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subsequently dismantled following a Commonwealth Government election (see Simshauser & 
Tiernan, 2018).   
 
In spite of the Carbon Tax, sharply rising natural gas prices, contracting energy demand in the 
NEM (the first such episode on record), and the ramp-up of Australia’s Renewable Portfolio 
Standard to a 20% market share by 2020 meant there was no economic basis for new CCGT 
plant to enter.11  Entry became the domain of renewables through policy mechanisms.  
Renewable Energy Certificates had a traded average of $38/MWh over 2012-2015 (with 
considerable inter-temporal variation driven by policy discontinuity) which when combined 
with low forward electricity prices facilitated a certain minimum level of variable renewable 
plant investment commitments in line with the 2020 schedule.  Although, as Figure 2 reveals, 
policy discontinuity in 2012 and in 2014 produced distinct investment troughs (Simshauser & 
Tiernan, 2018).   
 
Even though there was no CCGT plant entry, throughout this period forward power system 
models would still rely on CCGT entry costs as an important input for base load investment 
into the future, and, CCGT plant frequently formed the basis for calculating longer-dated 
Renewable Energy Certificate pricing.  That is, long run equilibrium Certificate prices for 
renewables could be derived by reference to the entry cost of wind (as the lowest cost 
renewable technology at the time) less the entry cost of a CCGT plant after adjusting for any 
volume weighted price differences.  Also during this period, the supply-demand imbalance 
meant underlying ‘black’ electricity prices remained low and would ultimately drive the exit 
of 5000MW of coal plant.   
 
 Period 4: 2016 to 2020+ – renewables plus ‘notional’ firming 
During the period 2016-2018 the cost of new variable renewable plant (i.e. wind and solar 
PV) had fallen quite considerably while simultaneously, coal plant exit at-scale produced a 
tight market with spot and forward contract prices surging.  Over this short period, more than 
8000MW of new variable renewable plant was committed (Figure 2).  
 Australian Variable Renewable Energy Investment Commitments (2012-2018)12 
 
Source: BNEF. 
 
Recall from Figure 1 (and see also Appendix I Fig.14) that in 2018 variable renewables 
formed the lowest cost entrant at $62.50/MWh (variability aside) with some reported 
transactions in the $50s - albeit for specific sites or with transaction-specific assumptions 
                                                 
11 In particular as Figure 13 (Appendix I) notes, given elevated prices for natural gas the marginal running cost of new CCGT 
plant remained higher than the marginal running cost of incumbent coal plant even after accounting for the $23/t Carbon Tax. 
12 Data also includes investment commitments from Western Australia and the Northern Territory as well as NEM regions. 
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including two-step pricing13).  But as is well understood in energy economics, using a single 
entry cost to describe variable renewable energy resources represents a flawed metric because 
it treats technology outputs as homogeneous products, as if governed by the law of one price 
(Joskow, 2011; Mills & Wiser, 2012; Edenhofer et al. 2013; Simshauser, 2018).   
 
Consequently, the carrying cost or shadow price of an OCGT plant forms the notional firming 
component (along with the upper price limit of financial products used for firming) and 
completes the reference technology set in 2018, and collectively amounts to about $75-
$80/MWh. In practice, the total cost of energy delivery will vary depending on market 
dynamics, including how often firming capacity is used, as well as the potential to earn 
additional revenue from OCGT plant (discussed further in Section 6).  To be clear, our 
analysis overlooks rising costs of Frequency Control Ancillary Services and what appears to 
be rising grid connection costs – the extent to which is yet to be fully revealed given most of 
the investment commitments in Figure 2 are yet to be commissioned.14 
 
Although variable renewable plant entry in 2016-2018 was driven by Australia’s 20% 
Renewable Portfolio Standard, coincident high spot prices produced a rising interest in 
market-driven wind and solar PV plant investments, along with a focus on how new variable 
renewable plant should be operated and integrated over the long-term in the NEM.  High spot 
market prices were in turn underpinned by elevated prices for coal and natural gas due to their 
newly found linkages with seaborne markets, the significance of which is examined in 
Section 4.   
 
4. Fuel Prices: coal and natural gas  
Most of the NEM’s 22,500MW coal-fired fleet, which has historically produced 150,000GWh 
per annum (cf. NEM load of c.190,000GWh) was built by former state-owned monopoly 
electricity commissions with plant design lives of 200,000 Equivalent Operating Hours (i.e. 
25-30 years).  While a number of coal plants in the NEM were developed as vertically 
integrated mine-mouth power stations15, many in the Queensland and New South Wales 
regions are not – they were developed with very long-dated, low cost coal supply agreements 
(legacy coal contracts). These legacy coal contracts typically spanned periods of 15-25 years 
which in turn underpinned both private sector mine development, and the future output of the 
State Electricity Commission’s coal plant.   
 
 Coal prices 
Over the past decade an increasing number of legacy contracts have matured, at which point 
coal-fired plants have been forced to replace historic ultra-low-cost contracts (ca.$1.00/GJ) 
with shorter term contracts linked to the Newcastle FOB export coal price.  Newcastle 
5500kcal coal futures contract prices have risen to more than $90/t ($4+/GJ).  The 
significance of this is highlighted in Figure 3, which traces the Newcastle FOB price (RHS 
axis, shaded area chart) and contrasts the marginal running cost of coal plant on legacy coal 
contracts (dashed black line, LHS axis) with the marginal running cost of coal plant based on 
the Newcastle export price (solid line chart, LHS axis).  Given NEM black coal plant heat 
rates range from 9320 – 10910 kJ/kWh and marginal loss factors of 0.975, 5500kcal coal 
                                                 
13 Recent PPA transactions for renewables in the $50s/MWh appear to reflect either of i). unique sites with excellent resource and 
network connection characteristics; or ii). more commonly, what we have labelled “two-step pricing”.  With two-step pricing, a 
low cost 15-year PPA is written is written (first step), and then for project years 16-30 elevated prices are assumed to prevail 
(second step) reflecting an elevated (but highly uncertain) forecast of future spot prices. The combination of the low contracted 
PPA prices (years 1-15) and high expected future spot prices (years 16-30) appear to collectively meet threshold equity returns.  
The implication of this two-step pricing is that Average Total Cost of such projects is higher than recent PPA pricing suggests.  
Based on our input assumptions, we find the Average Total Cost, levelized over 30 years, to be $62.50/MWh.   This is quite 
different from the European experience in which renewables receive a high Feed-in Tariff for an initial period, followed by lower 
expected market returns in the latter period. 
14 In the South Australian region where intermittent renewables already comprise 45+% of final demand, Frequency Control 
Ancillary Service Costs have increased very substantially.  From 2011-2014 aggregate FCAS costs in the South Australian 
region averaged $5.1 million per annum.  From 2015-2018 they had risen to $37.0 million per annum.  In relative terms, FCAS 
costs increased from 0.5% of market value over the period 2011-2014 (i.e. the spot electricity market comprising the remaining 
99.5%) to 3.4% over the period 2015-2018. 
15 Prominent vertically integrated power stations which own their coal mining operations include the Yang A & B and Yallourn 
in Victoria, and Millmerran, Kogan Creek and Tarong in Queensland. 
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prices are now producing plant marginal running costs of about $50/MWh, well above the 
historic $15/MWh production costs associated with legacy coal contract supply.  This 
becomes evident through an examination of the NEM’s Aggregate Supply Curve after 
isolating the 17,675MW (summer-rated) black coal fleet, in Figure 4.   
 Newcastle FOB coal price & coal plant marginal running costs 2013-2018 
 
Source: CEFC. 
 
Of special interest Figure 4 is the flat section of the black coal plant supply function, which 
ranges from 10,000MW to 14,500MW (commencing from the blue arrow).  Historically, this 
component of the supply curve would be priced in the $15-$20/MWh range, but from 2015 
onwards has progressively lifted to > $50/MWh.  Any subsequent policy which has the effect 
of placing an explicit price on carbon would see a further structural change. 
 NEM Supply Curve: Black Coal-Fired Generation Fleet 
 
Source: AEMO. 
 
 Natural gas prices and the impact of LNG exports 
Central to the NEM’s current market conditions, and to the medium-term outlook, is the dire 
circumstances facing the Australian east coast market for natural gas. Over the period 2014-
2016, three large LNG export plants in the Queensland region of the NEM were 
commissioned.  The LNG export terminals led to an almost 3-fold increase in final Australian 
east coast gas demand, rising from 630PJa to 1850PJa during FY2018 (Simshauser & Nelson, 
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2015; Grafton et al. 2017; Billimoria et al, 2018). This is illustrated in Figure 5, which 
presents final gas demand (daily resolution, TJ/d) from 2009-2018.   
 Expansion in aggregate demand for natural gas (TJ/day, 2009-2018) 
 
Source: GMAT. 
 
What Figure 5 does not capture is the under-utilisation of new LNG export plant capacity, and 
the consequential pressure this has placed on the domestic gas market.  Figure 6 presents the 
ramp-up and ongoing LNG plant capacity (daily resolution) and contrasts this with actual 
production: 
 Australian East Coast LNG Export Capacity vs LNG Production 
 
Source: GMAT. 
 
The significance of excess LNG capacity for the NEM was the linking of the domestic gas 
market to international price dynamics.  As with coal contracts, legacy gas supply contract 
prices were extremely low by global standards ($2.50 - $4/GJ) and once expired have been 
progressively replaced with oil-linked supply contracts with reduced tenors, elasticity-
adjusted volumes and in certain cases, double-netback margins (i.e. marking gas in southern 
NEM regions to the export commodity price, then adding transport costs to the north, then 
adding transport costs back to a southern delivery point).  The evolution of east coast gas 
prices from 2010-2018 is illustrated in Figure 7 – which has four important gas price 
parameters: i). the solid black line series traces legacy contract prices; ii). the blue line series 
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traces the 30-day moving average spot gas prices and note the step up once all 3 x LNG 
terminals were commissioned in 2016, i.e. the point at which the gas market entered a state of 
‘structural imbalance’; iii). the grey shaded area traces the export parity price of gas; and iv). 
the black and red markers show domestic gas offers and transactions, respectively, for 1-5 
year forward gas supply contracts.  Above all, domestic gas prices have shifted from $3-4/GJ 
to $8-12/GJ. 
 Eastern Australia gas market prices 
 
Sources: GMAT, ACCC. 
 
5. Entry dynamics in the NEM 1999-2018 
To summarise our modelling results (see Figure 1 and Appendix I), the Average Total Cost of 
incumbent plant in 1999 was $35/MWh.  From 1999-2004 the new entrant benchmark was 
coal at $35/MWh.  From 2005-2011 CCGT plant formed the new entrant at $45/MWh, but by 
2012-2015 gas prices had risen sharply and CCGT plant costs followed to $70/MWh ($78 
including the $23/t Carbon Tax).  From 2016 onwards, the falling cost of renewables meant it 
formed a part of a new entrant benchmark (albeit part of a technology set including an 
OCGT).  This new entrant benchmark has been underpinned by a characteristic quite 
unfamiliar to NEM participants - fuel costs that are increasingly linked to 
international/seaborne markets.  Just as 5500kCal coal futures and forward prices for LNG 
(and by implication, domestic natural gas) surged, the entry cost of renewables began to fall, 
aided by a shrinking window to monetise projects before Australia’s 20% Renewable 
Portfolio Standard would be fully subscribed, record low interest rates, record high 
Renewable Certificate prices, and a rush of institutional money into a solar PV boom.  These 
dynamics produced a new number for the power system’s long run equilibrium of about $75 - 
$80/MWh, which as we noted earlier is comprised of $60 - $65/MWh for wind and $14/MWh 
for the carrying cost or shadow price of an OCGT (but excludes any Frequency Control 
Ancillary Service costs, and the rising cost and complexity of grid connection).  The trend in 
new entrant costs and spot prices over the 20-year period 1998-2018 is illustrated in Figure 8.   
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 20-year nominal NEM Spot Prices and New Entrant Costs: 1999-2018 
 
Source: NEMMCo, AEMO, PF Model. 
 
Prima facie, power prices appear to have risen very sharply, rising as they have from 
$35/MWh to $75-80/MWh.  But these data and the stream of results in Figure 8 data are in 
nominal dollars, and 1999 was a long time ago.  Taking the results and presenting them in 
constant (2018) dollars indicates cleaner power generation is capable of being achieved at not 
very much increased cost. 
 NEM Spot Prices and New Entrant Costs: 1999-2018 (constant 2018 $) 
 
Source: NEMMCo, AEMO, PF Model, Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
6. On the stability of new entrant benchmarks 
In an energy-only market with a very high VoLL, the assumption that renewables and OCGT 
(or battery) firming represents the benchmark entry cost ultimately relies critically on gains 
from exchange in the NEM using existing spare capacity.  For this new entrant cost 
benchmark and associated equilibrium price to hold, it is important that energy is provided by 
the variable renewable generator, and during low production periods the OCGT plant (or 
battery) provides related insurance against extreme price spikes.  That is, the current 
benchmark technology set is not actually intended to physically produce at unity load factors.  
Far from it.  When the variable renewables component of the benchmark technology set is 
operating at low or zero load, it notionally “purchases” from existing spare capacity in the 
spot market (i.e. from existing coal, CCGT, hydro or uncorrelated renewable plant) and the 
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OCGT plant is merely used to “clip” exposures to very high spot price spikes, thus 
maintaining the imputed Average Total Cost within the specified range.16 
 
To be clear, this set of assumptions is entirely appropriate for the NEM.  A fundamental 
objective of the mandatory gross pool institutional design and an organised spot market is to 
enable participants to efficiently and cost effectively exhaust gains from exchange to meet 
firm forward contract commitments – acknowledging that when one provider is short, others 
will be long, and this exchange maximises welfare.  
 
Benchmark prices therefore depend on the composition of the balance of the market as well as 
policy externalities. As such, and holding fuel prices constant, there are (at least) two reasons 
why the NEM’s new entrant benchmark may be replaced by an alternate technology set. 
 
 Ongoing coal plant exit at-scale 
What happens when coal plant exits are so material that gains from exchange in the spot 
market are exhausted, such that “notional firming” from OCGT plant becomes increasingly 
“physical firming”?  Well before this point in time, the economics of the reference technology 
set will begin to deteriorate and a new benchmark equilibrium will necessarily emerge.  To 
physically back an intermittent portfolio by running an OCGT plant on $10/GJ fuel equates to 
a marginal running cost of at least $110/MWh, plus fixed and sunk capital costs of $14/MWh 
– regardless of whether the plant is operating (i.e. the insurance premium).  Adding these 
costs to variable renewables would quickly surpass the reference benchmark of $75-80/MWh 
for firmed variable renewables.  Recent published research by the Australian Renewable 
Energy Agency similarly demonstrates elevated cost results for variable renewables that have 
been physically-firmed by battery storage (see Lovegrove et al. 2018). 
 
The ongoing entry of low cost variable renewable energy plants are capable of replacing 
most, but not all, of the output from exiting coal plant.  A certain residual (~10-15%) needs to 
be covered by some other form of flexible generation.  As coal plant exit, this residual may 
ultimately be provided by new battery storage capacity, new pumped-storage hydro, solar 
thermal (with storage) or some other dispatchable renewable resource such as biomass.   
 
But there is a nuance in our analytical framework and modelling – a key element 
underpinning our analysis is the collision between electricity market theory, and the harsh 
realities of applied corporate finance.  The need to “firm” a variable renewable plant at the 
plant owner level can only exist if non-trivial merchant spot price exposure exists (e.g. when 
legacy run-of-plant PPAs have expired).  Given financing constraints and the need for some 
degree of forward revenue certainty, few if any merchant plants are devoid of firm forward 
derivative contract commitments.  Firming merchant variable renewable plant requires being 
able to withstand elongated periods of low production against the financial exposures arising 
from firm forward derivative contract commitments, including exposures to a $14,500/MWh 
VoLL.   
 
As gains from exchange in organised spot markets are exhausted, any need to physically back 
variable renewable plant with new capacity during extended price-volatility events is likely to 
be delivered by natural gas for reasons of production run-time (i.e. length and continuity) – at 
least based on our existing technology cost assumptions.  Furthermore, our modelling 
indicates that once an OCGT plant is forced to operate more than ~20-30% Annual Capacity 
Factor it is more efficient to transition to other gas-fired generation technologies with superior 
thermal and environmental efficiency (viz. CCGT).   
 
                                                 
16 Conversely, an OCGT can be used to produce additional revenue even when the variable renewable resource is high, selling 
resources to the grid. 
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 Binding carbon constraints 
Australia’s international CO2 commitments17 amount to a 26-28% reduction against a 2005 
baseline.  With the surge in variable renewable investments from 2016 onwards, if the 
electricity sector is asked to do only a pro-rata share of CO2 emission reductions (i.e. current 
Conservative Liberal/National Party policy) the requirement for a price on carbon in Australia 
prior to 2030 is ambiguous.  However, for Australia to meet its economy-wide target, the 
electricity sector must do more than its pro-rata share (i.e. current Labor Party Policy). In this 
latter scenario, even though renewables plus notional firming forms the current new entrant 
benchmark, the natural replacement of existing coal capacity is not sufficient to transform the 
power system at a pace that matches the required reductions (viz. ca.45% reduction in 
electricity sector CO2 emissions by 2030).  
 
In the long-term, a price on carbon – whether implicit or explicit – is necessary to ensure 
ongoing reductions in CO2 emissions. There are many mechanisms which could achieve this; 
an emissions intensity trading scheme, a retailer emissions obligation, an explicit price on 
carbon, a regulatory standard or the regulated closure of coal plant over time (such as the 
federal regulations in Canada).    
 
 Returning to CCGT 
Assuming gas prices remain elevated (i.e. $8.50+/GJ), the new entrant cost of a CCGT is 
closer to $80-$90/MWh. In practice, the new entrant portfolio mix might include some 
combination of all available technologies, but the cost of an CCGT should represent a robust 
benchmark as the coal fleet retires and the prevailing gains from exchange are progressively 
exhausted.  Indeed, now that the British pool has lost a majority of their coal fleet, CCGT 
plant auctions seem to be in sharp focus as the optimal backup plant.  CCGT plant can be 
developed relatively quickly and represent a scalable near-term solution. However, 
developing CCGT is not without challenges:  
 
• In the absence of further Government intervention, high domestic gas prices are likely 
to persist and this makes banking such plant very complex cf lower capital cost 
OCGT plant.  We noted earlier that the maximum practical capacity of LNG 
terminals is 1620 PJ/a (Figure 6) and when combined with (reduced) domestic load of 
630 PJ/a, theoretical final gas demand totals 2250 PJ/a.  At current production rates of 
1850PJ/a (Figure 5), the market is 300-400 PJ/a short of theoretical final aggregate 
demand.  For gas users in the NEM, this is a sobering prospect – the gas market 
appears set to remain in structural theoretical shortage for at least a decade as 
aggregate supply struggles to catch up, thus continuing to place pressure on forward 
gas prices.    
 
• New CCGT plant represents a long-dated investment and may become time-sensitive 
to expected future carbon constraints in its own right – that is, the development of any 
non-renewable resource risks becoming a stranded asset by future carbon policy. 
Even now, regions such as California are pursuing energy storage as an alternative to 
replacing aging gas plant. 
 
• CCGT may face competition from energy storage technologies, including battery 
storage and pumped-storage hydro. New energy storage could allow for further gains 
from exchange in the NEM (i.e. by shifting excess renewable production to high net 
demand periods). Currently, our modelling does not support the development of 
battery storage solely for the purposes of energy arbitrage – but this may change over 
time if battery costs continue to fall. Conversely, while battery storage has the 
advantage of speed and precision in dispatch, short-duration energy storage provides 
only an imperfect hedge against firm forward derivative contract commitments. For 
retail businesses in the NEM exposed to VoLL, the possibility of critical event days 
                                                 
17 As a signatory to the Paris Agreement, Australia is committed to a global goal of holding average temperature increase to well 
below 2°C and pursue efforts to keep warming below 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. This is generally accepted to require low 
to zero net emissions from power systems by 2050. 
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may still leave residual and unacceptable risks of financial loss, that is, through very 
low probability but high impact, elongated price spike events. That said, cost-
effective energy storage would seem most likely to defer any transition from a 
renewables plus OCGT benchmark to a CCGT benchmark. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Our quantitative analysis suggests that renewables and notional firming (i.e. the carrying cost 
or shadow price of an OCGT plant) currently comprises the NEM’s new entrant benchmark.  
We did not incorporate rising FCAS costs, or what appears to be rising costs of grid 
connection.  Whether these become material will no doubt be revealed over time.  Leaving 
aside this caveat, an implicit yet crucial assumption underpinning this reference technology-
set is the existence of gains from exchange in organised spot markets, arising from existing 
underutilised capacity.   
 
As aging coal plant continues to exit – through policy via explicit (or implicit) carbon pricing 
or end of useful life – available gains from exchange may be progressively exhausted.  Under 
these circumstances, the role of notional backup capacity may progressively switch from a 
low-cost insurance product used to “clip” extreme price spikes, to an increasingly expensive 
form of energy production used to physically backup variable renewable production.  With 
elevated prices for natural gas, once OCGT capacity factors rise above ~20-30%, CCGT plant 
becomes more economic.  Of course, if the costs of energy storage technologies fall 
materially, it may defer the transition from OCGT to CCGT plant by facilitating greater gains 
from exchange through the NEM’s organised spot market.   
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Appendix I: PF Model Results  
Figures 10-13 produce the entry costs by technology for the timeframes 2004, 2007, 2012 and 
2018 respectively.  Data inputs are outlined in Tables 1 and 2.  Figure 10 presents 2004 entry 
costs.  Key variables driving these results were the very low cost of coal ($0.70/GJ) and 
natural gas ($3.00/GJ). Coal dominated entry.  
 New entrant technologies and entry costs in 2004 
 
 
Figure 11 presents 2007 entry costs.  Notice that coal plant is lower cost than CCGT plant – 
but during the 2007 Commonwealth Election both the Conservative Liberal/National Party 
Coalition and the Labour Party had a policy of implementing Cap and Trade Emissions 
Trading Schemes. Consequently, CCGT plant formed the new entrant benchmark – the 
NEM’s last coal plant commitment occurred in 2004.  No new coal plant has been committed 
since. 
 New entrant technologies and entry costs in 2007 
 
Figure 12 presents 2012 entry costs.  The rising estimated cost of new coal plant was 
driven by a number of factors; first, capital costs had increased from $1500/kW to 
$2250/kW as a result of moving from a Supercritical to an UltraSupercritical 
benchmark (requiring more advanced materials); second, coal mining costs had 
increased sharply and thus the marginal cost of fuel had increased to $40/t or about 
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$2/GJ, and given the imminent implementation of Australia’s(now defunct) $23/t 
carbon tax, equity returns in the model were adjusted from 12% to 15% (per Table 1).  
With respect to CCGT plant, new entrant cost increases from $45/MWh (in 2007) to 
$70/MWh were primarily driven by the price of natural gas commencing its upward 
drift to export parity prices, which at the time were ~$6/GJ (up from $3/GJ). Wind 
costs increased from 2007 to 2012 primarily due to high capital costs, shifting from 
$2100/kW to $2500/kW during this period. 
 New entrant technologies and entry costs in 2012 (ex-Carbon) 
 
 New entrant technologies and entry costs in 2012 (incl. Carbon) 
 
 
Figure 14 presents 2018 entry costs.  The increase in new coal plant is driven by the 
same factors as the prior period. Capital costs increased to $3050/kW in line with 
High Efficiency Low Emissions plant costs, and coal mining costs had increased to 
$50/t or $2.78/GJ – albeit well below export prices (and thus the assumption is that an 
otherwise stranded resource is monetised at the marginal cost of extraction.  CCGT 
plant entry costs are also being driven by the same factor, viz. the rising cost of 
natural gas, from $6/GJ to $8.50/GJ.  The new entrant cost of variable renewables on 
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the other hand have fallen sharply.  This is being driven by plunging capital costs (e.g. 
wind falling from $2500/kW to $1975/kW) and by a lower equity IRR, which in our 
experience reduced from 12% to 10%. 
 New entrant technologies and entry costs in 2018 (ex-Carbon) 
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